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Note
New Solutions to the Age-Old Problem of PrivateSector Bribery
Sarah Clark*
Seedy, underhanded, illicit, illegal—just a small sample of
countless adjectives that spring to mind with the mention of
bribery. In both the public and private sectors, the presence of
bribery “fosters a culture” of corruption, “moral ambivalence
1
and reckless opportunism.” After infiltrating private businesses, bribery can increase costs of business and decrease moral
and honest practices, but the potential for enormous gains from
such an unfair advantage still entices individuals and busi2
nesses to pay bribes.
A case study of Control Components, Inc. (CCI) underscores the excessive gains a company willing to commit bribery
could achieve. From 2003 to 2007, CCI paid approximately
$1.95 million in bribes to officers and employees of foreign pri3
vate companies. Each payment’s sole purpose was to give CCI
a competitive advantage through either increasing the number
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
Franklin and Marshall College. The author thanks JaneAnne Murray for her
encouragement and insightful comments; Staci Lieffring and the editors and
staff of Minnesota Law Review for their hard work and diligence; and her family and friends for their continuous love and support. Copyright © 2013 by
Sarah Clark.
1. Transparency Int’l, The Scale and Challenge of Private Sector Corruption, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 3, 7 (2009), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publications/doc/gcr/.
2. See David Hess, Corruption in the Value Chain: Private-to-Private and
Private-to-Public Corruption, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009, supra
note 1, at 19, 22.
3. See Information at 3–4, United States v. Control Components, Inc.,
No. 8:09-cr-00162-JVS (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009) (charging Control Components, Inc. with one count of conspiracy and one count of violating the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act).
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of contracts awarded to CCI or skewing competitive tenders fa4
vorably for CCI. As a direct result of these bribes, CCI produced a staggering $14.82 million in additional net profits from
5
sales, to the detriment of any CCI competitor.
Despite any inherent wrongfulness of CCI’s bribes, federal
prosecutors could not, and still cannot, prosecute CCI for any of
its bribes made to foreign private companies under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the main federal statute governing for6
eign bribery by American companies. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits payments or gifts by U.S. com7
panies or issuers to foreign public officials. Remarkably, the
FCPA does not contain a corresponding provision for bribery
8
between completely private entities.
Private-sector bribery, also known as private-to-private or
commercial bribery, is the lesser-known and prosecuted rela9
tion of public-sector bribery. However, recent scandals, increased deregulation, and the globalization of business have
highlighted the need to take action against both public and pri10
vate bribery. To account for this need, the Department of Justice (DOJ) currently uses statutes outside the FCPA to prosecute private-sector bribery. The Travel Act, the “little brother”
of the FCPA, and the mail and wire fraud statutes can individually, or as a tag-along to FCPA actions, prosecute all acts of
11
bribery, whether public or private.
Even though use of these statutes can supplement the
FCPA’s private-bribery shortcomings, it is a makeshift, inefficient, and problematic solution. Since its enactment, the FCPA
has “curtailed ‘business as usual’” for American companies pay12
ing bribes to foreign public officials. Its power lies in its mono4. See Thomas R. Fox, Robert Kennedy, the Travel Act and the FCPA,
FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Jan. 11, 2010, 1:44 PM), http://tfoxlaw
.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/robert-kennedy-the-travel-act-and-the-fcpa/.
5. See Information, supra note 3, at 4.
6. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006).
7. See id. § 78dd-2(a).
8. See id.
9. Antonio Argandoña, Private-to-Private Corruption, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS
253, 253–54 (2003).
10. Id. at 254.
11. See Fox, supra note 4.
12. NEAL ASBURY, CONSCIENTIOUS EQUITY 68 (2010).
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lithic deterrent effect; from its widespread use in prosecuting
foreign public bribery, American businesses understand that a
13
FCPA prosecution can bring large fines and public notoriety.
Conversely, the DOJ must prosecute private foreign bribery
14
through a patchwork of statutes. This system fails to provide
the same coherent and intimidating basis to deter private brib15
ery. Until the DOJ can call upon a single, prominent statute
to prosecute foreign private bribery, it will lack the ability to
instill the same fear of prosecution as it can for public bribery
16
under the FCPA.
Not all countries use a roundabout method to prosecute
private bribery. On July 1, 2011, the United Kingdom’s Bribery
Act 2010 (U.K. Bribery Act) went into effect, rivaling the FCPA
17
as the most severe anti-bribery statute in existence. The U.K.
Bribery Act bars bribery of both foreign officials and private
18
companies and individuals. By encompassing all forms of corporate bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act makes it clear to prosecutors and businesses alike that committing acts of private brib19
ery is a serious offense.
This Note argues that there is a need to reform current
techniques of prosecuting foreign private bribery in the United
States, as current methods are haphazard, confusing, and neglect to take advantage of the symbolic power of the FCPA.
Part I describes private-to-private bribery and the background
of federal laws most associated with private bribery prosecutions—the FCPA, the Travel Act, and the mail and wire fraud
statutes. Part II elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of
private-sector bribery prosecution in the United States and the
United Kingdom. Finally, Part III explains why the process to
prosecute private-to-private bribery in the United States must
be updated by amending the FCPA and highlights the U.K.
13. Id.
14. See Hess, supra note 2, at 23.
15. Id. (discussing how internationally, differing standards on private
bribery detract from effective private-to-private corruption deterrence).
16. See id.
17. See Jonathan Russell, Fears Bribery Act Will Harm PLC, TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/bribery-act/
8272140/Fears-Bribery-Act-will-harm-UK-plc.html.
18. See id.
19. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (U.K.).
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Bribery Act as a model for reform. Despite existing statutes’
ability to supplement FCPA prosecutions, an FCPA that encompasses all forms of foreign bribery is the most efficient and
fair way to eradicate corporate bribery.
I. REGULATING PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY
Despite the fact that the FCPA was enacted over thirty-five
years ago, much confusion still exists as to who can be subject
to a bribery prosecution in the United States. The FCPA only
proscribes bribes paid to foreign officials by individuals and
20
companies affiliated with the United States. Because the
FCPA cannot prosecute foreign private-sector bribery, other
federal statutes, self-regulation, and international legislation
21
have attempted to fill the void.
A. BRIBERY
1. Bribery Defined
Although it can take many shapes and forms, “[v]ery simply, a bribe is a payment made with an intention to corrupt the
recipient, not for its own sake, but in the process of providing a
22
good or service to the giver.” In other words, a bribe is a type
of payment made to influence another to perform his or her du23
ties dishonestly. The bribe itself can span the gamut of a few
dollars to “grease the wheels” of a business transaction to millions spent by corporations to obtain or maintain business
24
deals. Bribery laws can criminalize either the giver of the
25
bribe or the bribe recipient. Under American law, the giver of
26
bribes traditionally faces prosecution.
Bribery by corporations can be separated into two categories: public and private. Public-sector bribery, targeted by the
FCPA, is the bribing of a foreign government official to obtain
20. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006).
21. See Fox, supra note 4.
22. C. Gopinath, Recognizing and Justifying Private Corruption, 82 J.
BUS. ETHICS 747, 748 (2008).
23. See id.
24. See Samart Powpaka, Factors Affecting Managers’ Decision to Bribe:
An Empirical Investigation, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 227, 227 (2002).
25. See id.
26. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2006).
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27

or retain business. In most cases, public-sector bribery is fairly easy to recognize. Classic cases of public-sector bribery include illegal payments to government officials, often by compa28
nies attempting to expand into new foreign markets.
Less frequently prosecuted, but equally as important to
29
recognize, is private-sector bribery. Private-sector bribery occurs when a manager or employee who has power or responsibility in a corporation acts contrary to his responsibilities and
either “directly or indirectly harms the company or organization, for his own benefit or for that of another person, company,
30
or organization.” This type of bribery encourages a privatesector employee to either act or refrain from acting, in breach of
31
his or her required duties. An example of private-sector bribery is a payment by a company manager to a distributor to ob32
tain a new distribution agreement or license.
2. Effects of Public-Sector and Private-Sector Bribery
In both the private and public sectors “[t]ransnational
bribery . . . inhibits economic development and distorts competition. It disrupts distribution channels, destroys incentives to
27. See CRIMINAL DIVISION, DOJ & ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, SEC, A REGUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2; Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 398
(2010); see also Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-43 (1997) (requiring new signatory countries to recognize a definition of
bribery of public officials similar to that in the FCPA). For a recent example of
public-sector bribery, see Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart
Takes a Broader Look at Bribery Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1 (discussing the inquiry by Wal-Mart and the Justice Department on whether WalMart subsidiaries paid illegal bribes to gain better access to markets in
Mexico).
29. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749.
30. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 255.
31. See Memorandum from the International Chamber of Commerce to
the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions
§ 2 (Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ICC Memorandum], available at http://www
.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2006/Memorandumto-the-OECD-Working-Group-on-Bribery-in-International-BusinessTransactions/.
32. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 256.
SOURCE
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compete on quality and price, undermines market efficiency
and predictability,” and causes firms and countries to lose long33
term competitiveness.
Within the public sector, bribery incentivizes governments
to increase regulation and red tape. Although the bribe was
originally intended to avoid unnecessary delays and costs, paying a bribe almost always leads to the need to pay more or
higher bribes, entirely negating any attempt to “grease the
34
wheels.” Further, studies indicate that bribes are more likely
35
to be taken in countries with a low per capita income. This,
coupled with research indicating that corrupt countries are associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, growth,
direct foreign investment, education spending, environment
36
quality, and reduced appearance of governmental legitimacy,
demonstrates that bribery by businesses can deny impover37
ished nations the chance to have a minimal standard of living.
Additionally, these bribes can harm the payers’ home countries
as safety and quality controls suffer when corrupt businesses
38
attempt to make money as quickly as possible.
While it is generally accepted that bribes cause social
39
harm, private-sector bribery in particular can cause negative
33. See Powpaka, supra note 24, at 227 (citation omitted).
34. Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 864–69
(2010).
35. See Miriam F. Weismann, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The
Failure of the Self-Regulatory Model of Corporate Governance in the Global
Business Environment, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 615, 628 (2008).
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and
Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2010); see also Randal C.
Archibold, Even as It Hurts Economy, Bribery Is Taken in Stride, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2012, at A4 (discussing negative economic effects of overlooking public-sector bribery in Mexico); Dev Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY (Jan. 2012), http://mexico.gfintegrity.org/en/ (summarizing the results
of an economic study of Mexico that found that Mexico lost over $872 billion
from 1970 to 2010 through illicit financial flows composed mainly of corruption, bribery, and kickbacks).
37. See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 275–76 (2008).
38. See Spahn, supra note 34, at 892–98.
39. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin
America, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 179, 180 (1996) (finding corruption, including bribery, can have severe economic, political, and social costs).
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economic, political, and commercial impacts in the countries
40
where the bribe occurs. Private-sector bribery causes “signifi41
cant harm to society by distorting the marketplace.” In instances of private-sector bribery, the action may appear to be a
seemingly harmless hiring of a less qualified employee or the
42
favoring of an inferior supplier. However, on a broad, international scale, such actions in the aggregate degrade certainty
43
and honesty in business, increasing transaction costs for all.
Employees from large companies can demand bribes or kickbacks from potential suppliers, or even disguise bribes through
44
inappropriate gifts and hospitality to clients. As such, privatesector bribery, committed repeatedly, has the effect of eliminating the principles of merit-based selection and fair competition
45
that are essential to the functioning of efficient markets. In
fact, Transparency International’s 2011 Bribe Payers Index,
which interviewed 3016 business executives across thirty countries, found that the perceived frequency of private-sector
bribes was usually as high, if not higher than bribery of public
46
officials, across all studied business sectors. The survey
warned that without national legislation barring private-sector
bribery, it will continue to affect entire supply chains, distort
markets and competition, and penalize small businesses that
47
cannot pay such bribes and those that simply refuse to do so.
The recognition of the harms caused by private-sector bribery to both the briber and the bribee is crucial. Private-toprivate bribery “undermines the smooth functioning and credibility of free, open and global competition” by contributing to
the cost of business and “penaliz[ing] loyal market partici-

40. See Powpaka, supra note 24, at 227.
41. Hess, supra note 2, at 20.
42. See id. at 21 (citing the example of how bribery in supplier and subcontractor transactions can distort the bidding process and create strong incentives to pay bribes to remain competitive or gain information about competitors’ bids).
43. See id. at 22.
44. See DEBORAH HARDOON & FINN HEINRICH, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
BRIBE PAYERS INDEX REPORT 2011, at 19 (2011), available at http://bpi
.transparency.org/bpi2011/results/.
45. See Hess, supra note 2, at 22.
46. See HARDOON & HEINRICH, supra note 44, at 18–19.
47. See id.
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48

pants.” Recognizing the problems caused by private commercial bribery, governments have attempted to criminalize such
behavior.
B. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The mere whisper of a potential FCPA investigation causes
terror to American companies transacting in international
49
business. Calls for a statute like the FCPA began in the af50
termath of the Watergate scandal. In 1973, an investigator
discovered that Gulf Oil and its Vice President had spent over
$10 million from 1960 to 1973 “on illegal political activities and
51
in business transactions abroad.” As disturbing as this discovery was to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it
led to the question: how many other companies were participat52
ing in this same behavior? To answer this question, the SEC
offered an amnesty program for corporations to self-report any
53
similar payments by their own organization. With this potential reprieve from indictment, more than 400 companies reported their practice of making payments to foreign officials, politi54
cal parties, and politicians, totaling over $300 million.
Realizing the systemic nature of these foreign political pay55
ments, Congress unanimously passed the FCPA in 1977.
The FCPA has two principal mechanisms to deter bribery
abroad: prohibiting payments to foreign officials and requiring
56
strict corporate accounting and record-keeping practices. Although the accounting and record-keeping provisions are extremely important to ensure companies utilize proper account-

48. ICC Memorandum, supra note 31, § 1.
49. See Jordan Weissmann, The Corruption Law That Scares the Bejesus
out of Corporate America, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/the-corruption-law-that-scares-thebejesus-out-of-corporate-america/256314/ (discussing how the FCPA “keeps
corporate lawyers and c-suite executives tossing in their sleep”).
50. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 617.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 3–4 (2d ed. 2010).
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57

ing controls, the anti-bribery provisions dominate most dis58
cussions of the FCPA. These anti-bribery provisions prohibit
U.S. companies and their employees, U.S. citizens, foreign
companies that list shares on a U.S. stock exchange or file reports with the SEC, and any person within the United States
from: “(i) corruptly paying, offering to pay, promising to pay, or
authorizing the payment of money, a gift, or anything of value;
(ii) to a foreign official; (iii) in order to obtain or retain busi59
ness.”
60
Despite questions as to the FCPA’s efficacy, or to its po61
tentially ambiguous language, the FCPA is clear in its purpose to provide tough sanctions for those who commit foreign
62
public-sector bribery abroad. Under the FCPA, criminal sanc63
tions for businesses could include fines up to $2,000,000. Individuals, officers, directors, stockholders, employees, and agents
64
can face fines up to $100,000 and five years in prison. But,
with the addition of the Alternative Fines Act, the fine could
potentially rise to twice the benefit the defendant attempted to
65
receive in paying the bribe. Additionally, the FCPA allows the
DOJ to pursue civil remedies that can include sanctions on
business entities and individuals of up to $16,000 per viola66
tion. However, as the FCPA only applies to bribes of foreign
57. See id. at 41.
58. See id. at 7.
59. Koehler, supra note 28, at 389–90; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006) (FCPA anti-bribery provision).
60. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 28, at 410–12 (noting that many FCPA
enforcement actions are based on ambiguous or untested legal theories);
Weismann, supra note 35, at 625–26 (finding that the FCPA’s reliance on
mandatory self-regulation by corporations has failed, evidenced by recent,
large-scale prosecutions).
61. See Dionne Searcey, But Who’s a ‘Foreign Official?’ FCPA to Get Key
Test Next Month, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://blogs
.wsj.com/law/2011/02/22/but-whos-a-foreign-official-fcpa-to-get-key-test-nextmonth/ (noting that the term “foreign official” is ineffectively defined in the
FCPA).
62. See Andre M. Penalver, Note, Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater
Problem and the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 469–70
(2010).
63. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 68.
64. Id.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
66. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 69.
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67

officials, the DOJ has had to use creative methods to prosecute foreign private-sector bribery.
C. CURRENT METHODS TO PROSECUTE TRANSNATIONAL
PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY
In an effort to find a way to prosecute foreign privatesector bribery, the DOJ has turned to statutes not originally intended for such a purpose. The Travel Act and the mail and
wire fraud statutes permit the DOJ to rely on violations of state
bribery laws and illegal uses of mail or interstate wire communications as the basis for federal private-sector bribery actions.
Comparatively, in one all-encompassing statute, the U.K. Bribery Act authorizes prosecutions of both public and private foreign bribery. Both the United States and the United Kingdom
also attempt to encourage self-regulation of businesses as a
means to supplement bribery laws.
1. The Travel Act
Notably, the DOJ has with increasing frequency joined
Travel Act charges to FCPA actions to account for the FCPA’s
68
inability to prosecute private-sector bribery. Enacted in 1961,
the Travel Act’s original purpose was to “combat[] organized
crime and racketeering by making illegal certain activities that
69
extend across state and national borders.” A violation of the
Travel Act essentially requires a two-step process by the DOJ:
it must demonstrate that the activity meets the required elements in the Travel Act, as well as that it violates a separate
70
71
state or federal law. Because of its organized crime origins,
67. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006)
(referring only to public-sector bribery).
68. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Law Firm: DOJ Increasingly Using Travel Act
to Prosecute Commercial Bribery, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Sept.
28, 2010, 2:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/28/law
-firm-doj-increasingly-using-travel-act-to-prosecute-commercial-bribery/.
69. Keith E. Henderson & Karen A. Guida, United States, in PRIVATE
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 479, 493 (Günter Heine et al. eds., 2003).
70. See, e.g., Stuart F. Pierson, The Travel Act: FCPA’s Sidekick Can Ride
Alone—Globally, TROUTMAN SANDERS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www
.troutmansanders.com/08-24-2009/ (identifying the elements of the Travel Act
and noting its increased use by the Justice Department in FCPA prosecutions).
71. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (noting that the
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the Travel Act criminalizes only certain “unlawful activities,”
72
including, among others, extortion, bribery, and arson. Because bribery is a covered “unlawful activity,” the federal government can prosecute foreign private-sector bribery under the
Travel Act if it first proves that a person:
(a) traveled in or used the facilities of interstate commerce; (b) attempted to or actually did promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitated the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying
on . . . of . . . an unlawful activity . . . and (c) formed a specific intent
to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate one of the predi73
cate crimes.

Second, the federal government must also prove that the
bribe violates a separate state or federal law that prohibits pri74
vate bribery. Since no federal law specifically bars foreign private-sector bribery, the United States government can only
prosecute private-sector bribery under the Travel Act if the
75
bribe violates a state law. In sum, to bring a Travel Act action
for foreign bribery, a federal prosecutor must show that a person committed a predicate violation of state law, and that the
bribery was committed intentionally by travelling in or using
some facility of interstate commerce. Currently, at least twen76
ty-nine states have laws against private commercial bribery.
While using state laws to serve as a predicate for Travel
Act violations is not a novel approach, the use of the Travel Act
as a tag-along to FCPA indictments is a new and increasing

Travel Act was “one of many bills enacted by the 87th Congress” that addressed organized crime).
72. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006).
73. Henderson & Guida, supra note 69, at 493–94.
74. See Travel Act § 1952(b); see also Richard L. Cassin, Prosecuting Private Overseas Corruption, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 10, 2009, 8:02 PM), http://
fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/tag/private-overseas-bribery (using a case study
to explain the process and restrictions of Travel Act actions).
75. See Richard L. Cassin, We Repeat, It’s the Travel Act, FCPA BLOG
(May 4, 2011, 6:49 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/4/we-repeat-its
-the-travel-act.html (noting that state laws prohibiting bribery to private parties are “enough to support a Travel Act charge in a federal prosecution”).
76. See John P. Rupp & David Fink, Foreign Commercial Bribery and the
Long Reach of U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG L. REP.—CORP. & M&A L., Jan. 2012, at
1, 2 (2012), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/6f93a9ee-340d
-49b3-83fe-252d3ddc8ced/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5af5fff4-f264
-42f2-aace-2781d6869cd9/Foreign_Commercial_Bribery_and_the_Long_
Reach_of_U.S._Law.pdf.
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77

trend. On July 31, 2009, the DOJ announced that Control
Components Inc. (CCI), a California company that designs and
manufactures valves, had pled guilty to violations of the FCPA
78
and the Travel Act. The DOJ found that CCI had participated
in “a decade-long scheme to secure contracts in approximately
thirty-six countries by paying bribes to officials and employees
of various foreign state-owned companies as well as foreign and
79
domestic private companies.” The DOJ’s press release specifically noted that CCI had made corrupt payments to “officers
and employees of state-owned and privately-owned customers
around the world, including in China, Korea, Malaysia and the
United Arab Emirates, for the purpose of obtaining or retaining
80
business for CCI.” In CCI’s case, its private-sector bribery violated California law, which formed the basis for the Travel Act
81
indictment by the DOJ. By bringing a Travel Act action
against CCI, the DOJ demonstrated its enthusiasm to prosecute both public and private foreign bribery.
82
In United States v. Carson, the DOJ brought FCPA and
Travel Act charges against six executives of CCI, including
Stuart Carson, CEO of CCI, and his wife, Hong “Rose” Carson
83
(the Carson defendants). Challenging the Travel Act indictments, the Carson defendants brought one of the first legitimate challenges to the application of the Travel Act to private
foreign bribery by claiming, among other things, that the Trav84
el Act does not apply extraterritorially. In disagreeing with
77. See Cassin, supra note 75 (noting the increase of Travel Act charges in
FCPA cases in recent years).
78. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Control Components Inc. Pleads
Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $18.2 Million Criminal
Fine (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09
-crm-754.html.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Cassin, supra note 74.
82. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-cr-00077-JVS, 2011 WL
7416975 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
83. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Six Former Executives of California Valve Company Charged in $46 Million Foreign Bribery Conspiracy (Apr.
8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-322
.html.
84. See Richard L. Cassin, Carson Case Tests the Travel Act, FCPA BLOG
(Aug. 10, 2011, 7:28 AM), http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2011/8/10/
carson-case-tests-the-travel-act.html.
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the Carson defendants, Judge James Selna found that, although this case did not require Travel Act could be applied ex85
traterritorially. In his order, Judge Selna commented on future use of the Travel Act in foreign private bribery cases by
stating that “criminal statutes may apply extraterritorially
even without an explicit Congressional statement . . . . The
Court agrees with the Government that ‘plain language of the
Travel Act demonstrates Congress’s desire to reach conduct
86
overseas.’” Although yet to be tested by other judicial districts,
the Central District of California has seemingly cemented the
government’s ability to use the Travel Act as a tool in prosecuting international private-sector bribery.
Another Travel Act prosecution involved Nexus Technolo87
gies, a Pennsylvania-based corporation. In Nexus Technologies’ case, three sibling executive employees were charged with
knowingly and willfully using a facility in foreign commerce
with the intent to commit bribery in violation of Pennsylvania
88
law. Two of the sibling defendants, Nam Nguyen and his
brother An, pled guilty to a violation of the Travel Act in con89
nection with “commercial bribes, and money laundering” and
90
consequently received prison sentences. The cases against
CCI and Nexus Technologies demonstrate the DOJ’s willing-

85. See Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *6–7, *12 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). The court noted that, if it had needed to, it could apply the
Travel Act extraterritorially as the “nature of the offense expressly contemplates foreign conduct.” Id. at *7–8 (internal quotations omitted). As support,
the court compared the congressional intent of applying the Travel Act abroad
to the intent of applying the FCPA abroad. Id. at *8.
86. Id. at *6–7 (internal citations omitted).
87. See Superseding Indictment at 24, United States v. Nexus Techs., Inc.,
No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009).
88. See id.
89. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Nexus Technologies Inc. Employees and Partner Sentenced for Roles in Foreign Bribery Scheme Involving
Vietnamese Officials (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/September/10-crm-1032.html.
90. See Richard L. Cassin, Four Sentenced for Vietnam Graft, FCPA BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2010, 11:04 AM), http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2010/9/16/
four-sentenced-for-vietnam-graft.html. Violating the Travel Act can lead to a
sentence of up to five years in prison, a fine, or both; multiple Travel Act violations could warrant prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2.
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ness to attempt to find a way to remedy the FCPA’s inability to
prosecute acts of foreign private-sector bribery.
2. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
91

92

The mail and wire fraud statutes, and the honest ser93
vices law, which amends the mail and wire fraud statutes,
apply to cases of foreign private-sector bribery. The mail and
wire fraud statutes “make it a crime to devise a scheme to deprive another of the right of honest services” through the use of
94
mail, wire, radio, or television communications. Both statutes
use the phrase “fraudulent scheme,” which is very broad and
95
includes bribery. As such, these statutes are used with great
frequency in today’s global market, as it is virtually impossible
to do business without using interstate or international mail or
wire communications, such as telephone calls, facsimiles, or
96
sending letters and packages. The elements of each statute
are almost identical, except for the difference in the trigger instrument (whether through use of the mails or wires) and the
fact that the wire fraud act requires a communication to cross
97
state lines. Also, to fall under the scope of the mail and wire
fraud statutes, a prosecutor does not need to prove an underly98
ing crime; a defendant does not need to personally wire or
mail a letter containing a bribe, but only cause the interstate
99
mailing or wire communication. The ease in proving such a
violation makes the mail and wire fraud acts a “federal prose91. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
92. See id. § 1343.
93. See id. § 1346.
94. David M. Howard et al., Private Commercial Bribery: The Next Wave
of Anti-Corruption Enforcement?, DECHERT ON POINT (Dechert LLP), Apr.
2010, at 4 (citing United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1998)),
available at http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/06d068f9-52ef-4c4e-a956
-44345cb1a4b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9e04f35f-aeae-4418-95a84eae8ae3e5cb/White_Collar_SA_04-10_Private_Commercial_Bribery.pdf.
95. Commercial Bribery, EXECUTIVE LEGAL SUMMARY 54 (2012), available
at Westlaw EXECLSUM.
96. See DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
§ 2.03 (2004) (noting “[i]t is difficult to imagine a commercial transaction today” that does not involve these communication methods).
97. See id.
98. See Commercial Bribery, supra note 95.
99. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, at § 2.03, 2-9.
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cutor’s ‘true love,’ because they provide a basis for criminal lia100
bility in a broad spectrum of instances.”
In 1988, Congress amended and enlarged these already
wide-reaching statutes through enactment of the honest ser101
vices amendment. Originally, its language encompassed any
“scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
102
honest services,” which greatly expanded public officials and
business professionals’ potential for liability under the mail
103
and wire fraud acts. The amendment aimed to criminalize
any situation where a fiduciary deprived a person they were in
104
a fiduciary relationship with of “honest services.” This would
include situations involving private actors paying bribes that
were not otherwise covered in other federal bribery statutes
105
(like the FCPA that only applied to public officials). However
in 2010, the Supreme Court found such a broad interpretation
unconstitutionally vague, and subsequently narrowed the honest services amendment to only situations where a fiduciary
100. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40852, DEPRIVATION OF
HONEST SERVICES AS A BASIS FOR FEDERAL MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD CONVICTIONS 1 (2010).
101. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181,
4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). Prior to McNally v. United States,
circuit courts allowed a broad reading of the mail statute to include the right
to honest services, in addition to deprivations of money or property, within “a
scheme or artifice to defraud.” See Margaret Ryznar, The Honest-Services Doctrine in White-Collar Criminal Law, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 83, 87–88 (2011). After the decision in McNally pared back the mail fraud statute to include only
deprivations of money or property, Congress passed the honest services
amendment to once again allow a “scheme or artifice” to defraud to include the
right to honest services. See id. at 88.
102. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
103. See Ryznar, supra note 101, at 88.
104. See Paul M. Kessimian, Note, Business Fiduciary Relationships and
Honest Services Fraud: A Defense of the Statute, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
197, 211. Such a broad reading of the mail and wire fraud acts caused significant outcry when prosecutors tested the outer limits of the statutes prior to
amendment; one such case involved a lawyer convicted of mail fraud for
breaching his duty of loyalty to the firm’s clients. See Ryznar, supra note 101,
at 87.
105. See Ryznar, supra note 101, at 84 (noting that prosecutors used the
honest services amendment to prosecute individuals in both the public and
private sectors). Over time, the honest services amendment has applied to corporate officers, purchasing agents, stockbrokers, and others in the private sector who owe “clear fiduciary duties to their employees or unions.” McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 363 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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deprives a person of “honest services” through a bribery or
106
kickback scheme.
Despite its narrowing by the Supreme
Court, the honest services amendment should still apply to acts
of private sector bribery, as bribery and kickback schemes directly limit a victim’s right to have honest services from an offi107
cial or employee.
Additionally, to ensure that the government can prosecute
international private-sector bribery, the Supreme Court has
upheld application of the mail and wire fraud statutes extrater108
ritorially. With their adaptability to most instances of criminal fraud and the assurance under the honest services amendment that they are applicable to bribery and kickback schemes
in the private-sector, the mail and wire fraud statutes can be
used to supplement FCPA actions and are “frequently . . . the
sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ev109
er-innovative practitioners of deceit.”
3. Corporate Self-Regulation
Another technique used in the United States to combat foreign bribery, either by design or due to a previous lack of understanding as to the implications of foreign private-sector
110
bribery, is corporate self-regulation. Many companies prefer
106. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–34 (2010). A practical example of using an honest services violation to bring a mail or wire
fraud statute action is when a corporate officer or employee acts against their
company’s best interests to pursue a self-interested transaction, and in doing
so, uses the mail or some form of wire communication. See DOYLE, supra note
100, at 6–7. (quoting United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 126–27 (2d. Cir.
2003) (en banc)). In this instance, the DOJ would be able to supplement a
FCPA action with either the mail or wire fraud statute and bring charges for
private-sector bribery. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 17 (citations omitted) (noting that Congress intended to reach fraud and kickback schemes by protecting that “intangible right to honest services”).
108. See Howard et al., supra note 94, at 4 (citing Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005)). Although not specifically applying the mail and
wire fraud statutes extraterritorially, the Pasquantino Court noted in dicta
that the statutes’ language was surely not intended to have “only domestic
concerns in mind.” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371–72 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, at § 2.03, 2-8 (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, Part 1, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980)).
110. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 253–54.
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to self-police internal acts of bribery, thus avoiding high legal
111
costs and the imposition of government in business affairs.
Self-regulation is a fairly controversial method, as it relies on
the would-be-perpetrators (or their companies) of the bribery to
enact and enforce corporate governance guidelines to eradicate
112
bribery issues. The effectiveness of self-regulation can generally be viewed on a spectrum from completely ineffective to a
good supplement to existing criminal and civil bribery statutes.
Advocates of using internal corporate regulation to police
bribery argue that the private sector is more efficient than out113
side actors at regulating itself. As support, advocates argue
that: (1) corporations have a vested interest in self-preservation
and will stop employees from taking actions that could harm
the business; (2) there are few incentives for this type of behavior as competitive markets eventually penalize inefficient behavior; and (3) private-sector bribery inherently has less of an
economic, social, and ethical impact than public-sector bribery
114
as it does not involve the corruption of public officials. Also,
critics of bribery statutes believe that bribery actions create an
enormous boon for government agencies and specialized law
firms and waste corporate resources on mandated DOJ investigations that could be more effectively used if companies self115
regulated.
Some critics go so far as to advocate no governmental regulation of bribery whatsoever. Opponents of statutes like the
FCPA argue that bribery is an unavoidable cost of business in
international business transactions and that bribery prosecutions hinder American companies who can no longer adequately
116
compete abroad. The main arguments against governmental
regulation of bribery, especially in an international business
111. See id. at 259.
112. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749 (noting that even though some
corporations have enacted ethics codes and training programs to combat corruption, “the practice of private corruption continues to exist”).
113. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 253.
114. See id. at 253–54.
115. See Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Law Racket, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at
70, 72 (noting that “a thriving and lucrative anti-bribery complex has
emerged” but questioning “[w]hether it’s having any impact on reducing bribery”).
116. See Spahn, supra note 34, at 862.
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context, are that bribes are necessary to “grease[] the wheels of
excessive government regulation,” that they do not cause personal harm to individuals, that they can actually be a benefit to
spurring new business, and that bribes are simply a practical
117
Addibusiness measure, utilized by numerous companies.
tionally, business leaders argue that FCPA prosecutions create
a “lopsided playing field” for American businesses that have to
compete with international companies not hindered by strin118
gent bribery laws.
However, such arguments against any monitoring of bribery are outweighed by the acceptance that bribery creates problems and causes strong negative societal implications, and, as
119
such, should be eliminated. Despite arguments in the United
States about how to go about such monitoring and regulation,
the United Kingdom has recently taken an extremely proactive
and definitive approach to prosecuting foreign private-sector
bribery.
4. United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010
In contrast to the multi-statute approach used to prosecute
bribery in the United States, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act
2010 explicitly makes illegal the bribery of public officials and
120
private businesses by companies or individuals, domestically
121
and internationally. The United Kingdom passed the U.K.
Bribery Act in response to criticism that its then-existing bribery laws were inadequate to prosecute newer and more intricate forms of bribery and that they were difficult to apply in
122
practice.

117. Id.
118. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 89 (2007).
119. Id. at 254.
120. See Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Help from My Friends? Understanding the U.K. Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1173 (2010).
121. See Arvinder Sambei, The U.K. Bribery Act 2010: An Overview, 27
INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 803, 803 (2011).
122. See Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its
Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 4–5 (2010) (noting that “[l]ittle had changed in [the prior]
legal framework during the last ninety years”).
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Before the enactment of the U.K. Bribery Act, the United
Kingdom did not have a comprehensive statute proscribing
123
bribery or corruption. Now, immediately in Section 1, the
U.K. Bribery Act states that it is an offense for a person to induce or reward a person to bring about an improper perfor124
mance in their relevant professional function. Using intentionally vague language—referring simply to a “person” and to
“improper performance”—the U.K. Bribery Act ensures that
125
“bribery in both the public and private sectors is covered.”
These revisions have arguably allowed the U.K. Bribery Act to
126
surpass the FCPA in aggressiveness to eliminate bribery.
Revising its bribery statutes was a bold step for the United
Kingdom as it clearly branched away from the FCPA’s system
of only targeting bribery of public officials. The United Kingdom took an opportunity in updating its bribery laws to use
FCPA language and ideas, while also making a clear statement
to businesses that private bribery would not be tolerated. In
recognizing the ineffectiveness of its previous patchwork sys127
tem of prosecuting bribery, the United Kingdom passed a
single comprehensive piece of bribery legislation to provide
prosecutors with the necessary tools to work toward eradicating
128
all forms of bribery.
The United States and the United Kingdom have different
techniques to combat the increasingly prevalent and recognized
issue of foreign private-sector bribery. The DOJ currently utilizes pre-existing statutes to supplement the FCPA’s inability
to prosecute private-sector bribery. On the other hand, the
United Kingdom created the U.K. Bribery Act, to encompass all
bribery offenses within a single statute. Each technique can
eventually reach the result of prosecuting international private-sector bribery, but their separate processes can make all
the difference in the effectiveness of such a prosecution.

123. See id. at 5.
124. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE 10 (2011).
125. Id.
126. See Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the
United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 420 (2011).
127. See Warin et al., supra note 122, at 4–5.
128. See Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 126, at 420.
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II. CRITIQUING CURRENT METHODS USED TO
ERADICATE PRIVATE BRIBERY
Each method used to prosecute or correct instances of private-sector foreign bribery in the United States is an attempt
at supplementing the FCPA. However, since each option is a
“fix” rather than a full solution to eliminate foreign privatesector bribery, each is inferior to an amended FCPA that encompasses all forms of foreign bribery. While the Travel Act
and mail and wire fraud statutes are capable of prosecuting
foreign bribery if the action violates a state private bribery law
or is an illegal use of interstate mail or wire communication,
these laws require cumbersome additional hurdles for the DOJ.
Also, while reliance on self-governance by private companies as
a means to combat private-sector bribery requires few resources, it is not a reliable stand-alone method. Finally, all of
these supplemental prosecutorial methods fail to take advantage of the arresting intimidation and public awareness inherent in FCPA actions. As such, the U.K. Bribery Act’s method to combine into one, forceful statute the means to prosecute
both public and private bribery is the best way to ensure all
forms are bribery are effectively discouraged and efficiently
prosecuted.
A. CURRENT TECHNIQUES IN THE UNITED STATES
1. The Travel Act
As no federal statute specifically outlaws the bribing or receiving of bribes in private business settings, the Travel Act is
an important way for the DOJ to supplement FCPA actions and
129
prosecute foreign commercial bribery. However, the benefit of
being able to rely on a statute outside the FCPA to prosecute
private-sector bribery is also the Achilles’s heel of prosecuting
private bribery under the Travel Act.
The Travel Act criminalizes “extortion, bribery, or arson in
violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the
130
United States.” Since neither the FCPA, nor any other feder129. Jeffrey J. Ansley et al., Commercial Bribery and the New International
Norms, BLOOMBERG L. REP., Sept. 2009, available at http://works.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=don_berthiaume.
130. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2006).
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al statute specifically criminalizes private-sector bribery, Travel Act actions must rely on state laws as the necessary predi131
cate statute. Currently, there are at least twenty-nine states
with bribery statutes that deal either directly with or are gen132
eral enough to include private commercial bribery. Regrettably for the DOJ, the remaining states likely lack the predicate
statute needed to bring a Travel Act action and the twenty-nine
states that do have private bribery statutes greatly vary on the
133
sentences imposed for a violation.
Such a system of disparate applicability can appear simultaneously unfair and confusing. For instance, if the private
commercial bribery is committed in Idaho, where there is no
predicate state private bribery law, there could be no Travel
Act action and the potential defendant seemingly gets away (at
least regarding a federal prosecution) “scot-free.” However, if
the private bribery took place in California, the location of
CCI’s predicate Travel Act prosecution, a defendant could face
a state penalty of imprisonment in the county jail for one year
if the bribe is $1000 or less, or imprisonment in a county jail or
state prison for sixteen months to three years for bribes over
134
$1000. In Minnesota, if the bribe is for $500 or more, the convicted defendant would face state sanctions of up to five years
135
in prison and a fine of $10,000. Additionally, the Travel Act
imposes a range of penalties based on the severity of the violation, from a sentence of no more than five years to life imprisonment, on top of what a defendant would face under state
136
law. One can imagine, given the variety of potential penal-

131. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3
(2006).
132. Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2 n.11 (noting these states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Washington).
133. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3(c) (West 2010), with MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.86, subdiv. 3(1) (West 2012) (illustrating how states handle foreign
private bribery sentencing’s differently).
134. See PENAL § 641.3(c).
135. See § 609.86, subdiv. 3(1).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A) to (B) (2006).
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ties, the difficulties in maintaining uniform federal prosecutions of private commercial bribery in the United States.
One of the greatest hindrances of the Travel Act becoming
an effective anti-bribery tool is the fact that many businesses
are unaware of its existence. Although prosecutions for Travel
137
Act violations are increasing, U.S. authorities still tend not to
bring private-sector bribery charges unless they relate to a
larger public-sector bribery prosecution or if prosecutors believe
138
a successful FCPA action is improbable. The fact that the
Travel Act relies on varied state laws contributes to this issue,
as does the Travel Act’s muted origins and lack of judicial in139
put. Due to the FCPA’s widespread recognition in the business sphere, many companies have in place strict measures to
140
ensure compliance. But, unlike the FCPA, the Travel Act was
not enacted following a watershed investigation, nor was it
141
even created to prosecute private bribery. In this way, the
Travel Act lacks the immense publicity the FCPA had upon its
enactment, and with the current lack of public Travel Act pros142
ecutions, its threat to companies as a private-sector bribery
statute will remain hidden until it garners the same awareness
as FCPA actions.
Proponents of the Travel Act point to the success of Travel
143
Act tag-along actions to FCPA prosecutions. As noted earlier,
in July 2009, Control Components Inc. pleaded guilty to viola144
tions of the FCPA and the Travel Act. Additionally, in September 2010, Nexus Technologies Inc. and two of its executives

137. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 78.
138. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2.
139. See Barry J. Pollack & Laura Billings, After 30 Years of the FCPA,
Will Courts Finally Get into the Act?, 34 CHAMPION 34, 34 (2010) (“[O]nly a
handful of FCPA cases have actually been litigated.”).
140. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 907, 1004 (2010).
141. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 1 (identifying the original purpose
of the Travel Act as “combat[ting] organized crime”).
142. See id. (stating that “foreign commercial bribery is not yet a primary
focus of U.S. enforcement activity”).
143. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 78 (discussing
Control Components, Inc.’s guilty plea to both FCPA and Travel Act violations).
144. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 78.
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pleaded guilty to FCPA and Travel Act violations. However,
these successes for the DOJ do not necessarily speak to the efficacy of the Travel Act, but rather companies’ fear of FCPA ac146
tions.
Since the FCPA’s inception, most companies have chosen to
settle pre-indictment or immediately after a FCPA indictment
147
by the DOJ. If a company is one of the few not offered a nonprosecution agreement (NPA) or a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) pre-indictment, then it will likely agree to the DOJ
filing a criminal information that is then resolved by a plea
148
agreement. For corporations, settling pre-indictment is cru149
cial to avoiding the “potential downside of litigation.” By settling, companies avoid “bad press and a subsequent stock devaluation” that would almost definitely result from a
150
prosecution. In fact, in the FCPA’s history, only two companies have attempted to defend FCPA charges and “put the DOJ
151
to its high burden of proof at trial.” As more Travel Act pri145. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 89.
146. See Mike Emmick, The Travel Act—The FCPA’s Red-Haired Stepchild,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 1, 2012), http://newsandinsight
.thomsonreuters.com/New_York/Insight/2012/02_-_February/The_Travel_Act_
%E2%80%93_The_FCPA_s_red-haired_stepchild/ (warning companies to not
prematurely celebrate when internal investigations reveal no bribes to foreign
officials and to not forget the Travel Act); see also Rupp & Fink, supra note 76,
at 2 (questioning whether the U.S. government would have even pursued
Travel Act charges in the Control Components case absent public-sector bribery).
147. See Pollack & Billings, supra 139, at 34.
148. See FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa
-101 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). See generally Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A
Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements Impede
the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 137, 153 (2010) (DPAs and NPAs are alternatives to litigation, as a
prosecutor can “forgo a trial in exchange for an agreement that punishes, deters, and rehabilitates a defendant.”). DPAs first require that formal charges
are filed, whereas under an NPA a defendant may escape the filing of any
formal charges. Id.
149. See Pollack & Billings, supra note 139, at 34.
150. Evan P. Lestelle, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
83 TUL. L. REV. 527, 529 (2008).
151. See FCPA 101, supra note 148 (“In 1991, Harris Corporation (and certain of its executives) prevailed in an FCPA trial when a federal court judge
granted a verdict of acquittal . . . . In 2011, Lindsey Corporation (and certain
of its executives) were found guilty by a federal jury of conspiracy to violate
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vate bribery actions are filed concurrently with FCPA investigations, corporations are likely to use the same cost-benefit,
settlement-minded analysis when deciding whether to contest a
Travel Act indictment as they do for FCPA indictments.
Because the Travel Act exists as an option to pursue private foreign bribery in the United States does not make it the
best or most efficient method to eradicate bribery. The Travel
Act’s reliance on various state laws, its piecemeal approach,
and its unfamiliarity to businesses make it a less than ideal
choice for foreign private bribery actions. To compensate for
times when the Travel Act is inapplicable as an FCPA supplement, the DOJ looks to the mail and wire fraud statutes to
prosecute acts of foreign private-sector bribery.
2. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
Mail and wire fraud statutes are usually applicable to cases of foreign-commercial bribery because businesses rely on interstate or international mail and wire communications in most
152
of their daily transactions.
However, despite the seeming
ease of attaching a mail and wire fraud action to an FCPA indictment, these statutes face difficulties in effectively prosecuting private-sector bribery. First, although the honest services
law was created to add clarity to the mail and wire fraud statutes’ scope, courts and many attorneys still find 18 U.S.C.
153
§ 1346 unconstitutionally broad. Additionally, the Supreme
Court’s limiting of § 1346 to only bribery and kickback
154
schemes has created additional questions as to its allowance
in purely private-sector situations.
As a first hurdle, a number of circuits have found that additional layers of analysis are required when pursuing an hon155
est services claim in a mail or wire fraud action. When the
Supreme Court attempted to limit § 1346 in Skilling v. United
States, it also emphasized the need to refer to “pre-McNally
156
cases,” which were tied to breaches of fiduciary duty. The
the FCPA and substantive FCPA violations.”).
152. WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, § 2.03, 2-16.
153. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 10 (discussing a generally recognized
need to limit the scope of § 1346).
154. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010).
155. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 10–11.
156. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2905; Charion L. Vaughn, Note, Power Cor-
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idea of a fiduciary duty in a public company is clear, but the
corresponding role of fiduciary duties of purely private actors,
where the only victim is a private company, still remains under
debate as Skilling declined to define how or when such fiduci157
ary duties arise. As such, the First, Fourth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have found that for a violation of the honest services statute to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, there
must also be a “‘recognizable scheme formed with intent to de158
fraud.’” In fact, the Seventh Circuit would go so far as to require defendants to aim for a personal private gain before rec159
ognizing a violation of the honest services statute.
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit, and to some extent the Third and
Eighth Circuits, require a state law violation before allowing a
160
honest services charge to continue.
This attempt to limit
§ 1346’s reach is due to federalism concerns and creates an additional required layer of inquiry for the federal government before it can pursue private bribery charges under the mail or
161
wire fraud statutes.
This confusion as to whether a mail or wire fraud action
requires demonstrating personal gain by defendants or an initial state law violation adds additional obstacles to bringing
federal private bribery charges. Such additional analysis
wastes resources which could be more effectively utilized in
pursuing or investigating additional instances of private-sector
foreign bribery. As the Supreme Court has not clearly described
the requirements for § 1346 actions in private bribery instances, the DOJ should not have to wait for additional clarification
by Congress or the Supreme Court before pursuing such actions. The FCPA was a “game changer” for foreign public bribery prosecutions and the DOJ should have an equally strong
and clear law to prosecute acts of foreign private bribery.
rupts: Honest Services Fraud and Fiduciary Duties, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 713,
726 (2011).
157. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936–37; Steven Wisotsky, Honest Services
Fraud after Skilling v. United States, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y
STUDIES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/honest
-services-fraud-after-skilling-v-united-states.
158. See Vaughn, supra note 156, at 719 (quoting United States v.
Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1980)).
159. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 11.
160. See Vaughn, supra note 156, at 719–20.
161. Id. at 721.
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3. Self-Regulation by Companies
As opposed to creating new, or supplementing existing
bribery statutes, some scholars and business insiders believe
the best method to eliminate private international commercial
bribery is through self-regulation by the companies them162
selves. The argument follows that companies are “much more
163
efficient” at protecting and monitoring their own interests.
These critics also generally find that fiduciary relationships are
already monitored in the United States, mainly through share164
holder class actions and derivative litigation, making the addition of a criminal penalty on top of this pre-existing avenue
165
for recovery superfluous.
Most agree that leaving some regulation of private bribery
to corporations positively contributes to its eradication. “Corporations who are keenly aware of the deleterious effects of corruption have established ethics codes and conduct training programs to make the employees aware of the standards of
166
behavior expected within the organization.”
This has led
some companies to create polices about receiving non-monetary
167
gifts and benefits—“such as tickets, trips, meals, favors, etc.”
However, the existence of a company code of ethics or antibribery management attitude does not guarantee that a company’s employees will always behave as instructed, “whether
out of ignorance or because their personal interests lie elsewhere, or because the actual culture of the company is at odds
168
with its declared aims.” And in fact, press reports suggest
that private corruption in companies that claim to self-regulate
169
continues to exist.

162. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 259–63 (providing suggestions for
companies looking to protect themselves from corruption).
163. Id. at 253.
164. See id. at 258–59 (stating that penalties for private-to-private corruption are based on fiduciary relationships and civil laws that provide for damages).
165. Cf. id. (discussing the limited results of criminal corruption legislation
and the preference for civil law remedies).
166. Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749.
167. See id.
168. Argandoña, supra note 9, at 259.
169. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749.

2013]

PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY

2311

The self-regulatory model, especially in an international
context, fails as a stand-alone method. Self-regulation is premised on “self-policing with regulatory oversight,” as government
enforcement creates a baseline of “normative ethical principles”
against which companies could structure their internal over170
sight and provides tangible consequences of non-compliance.
Without effective statutory enforcement of self-regulation, corporate compliance plans can become “little more than a protective measure designed to feign voluntary compliance under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the unlikely event that a
171
company gets caught . . . .”
Additionally, in the context of globalization, creating a
credible internal oversight program that is applicable and en172
forceable in every country is extremely difficult. “Cultural
mores in each country provide differing views about the legiti173
macy of bribery as a market behavior in the first instance.”
Also, these corporate compliance programs can lose effectiveness with increased organizational distances and when in coun174
tries with decreased regulatory presence.
Although self-regulation by companies is a positive technique that encourages companies to take a more proactive role
in eliminating bribery, it cannot function as a stand-alone
method to eradicate private bribery. As such, the only practical
solution to handle private-sector bribery is through increased
governmental enforcement in combination with existing inter175
nal policing measures. The U.K. Bribery Act has attempted to
combines both private and public-sector bribery regulation and
incentives for companies who attempt to self-regulate in a sin176
gle statute.
B. U.K. BRIBERY ACT
Stepping away from the United States’s piecemeal approach to prosecuting all forms of bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act
170. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 625–26.
171. Id. at 616.
172. See id. at 626.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 627.
175. See id. at 628.
176. See Pulina Whitaker, The UK Bribery Act: Be Prepared, 41 LAWYER’S
BRIEF, Aug. 31, 2011, at 2.
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was created to cover both public officials and private citizens
177
and specifically criminalize private-sector bribery. The guidance to Section 1 of the U.K. Bribery Act is explicit that any use
of the term “person” is intentionally broad, so as to include both
178
public and private-sectors. In rejecting the notion that private-sector bribery deserves less attention than public-sector,
the U.K. Bribery Act earned the nickname: the “FCPA on ster179
oids.”
Despite its succinctness and broad applicability in addressing all forms of bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act is relatively untested and faces its own critics. For instance, the U.K. Bribery
Act has faced criticism for including an affirmative defense for
180
companies that have “adequate procedures.” Section 7 of the
U.K. Bribery Act assigns liability to businesses that fail to prevent bribery within their organizations, regardless of whether
181
the bribe is to a private organization or a public official. However, under the “adequate procedures” defense, corporations
that can demonstrate they have acceptable safeguards in place
182
can avoid liability. It has also faced criticisms for ambiguity,
overreach, and even for being too difficult to execute and dra183
conian in nature.
Despite these and other criticisms, the U.K. Bribery Act’s
inclusion of all types of bribery within one statute is an important new way to allow for governmental regulation of foreign private-sector bribery. Any potential later issues, such as
177. See id. Also, unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act has no defense for
facilitation payments, has a provision making it an offense for corporations to
fail to prevent bribery, and does not require proof of “corrupt” intention. Id.
178. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 9 n.3.
179. See Johannes Scholtes, The UK Bribery Act, “FCPA on Steroids,” AIIM
EXPERT BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 4:46 AM), http://www.aiim.org/
community/blogs/expert/The-UK-Bribery-Act-e2809cFCPA-on-steroidse2809d.
180. Cf. Engle, supra note 120, at 1173 (discussing the adequate procedures defense and criticisms of the Act’s “ambiguity”).
181. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 15.
182. See Warin et al., supra note 122, at 30–31.
183. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1173; George Rosenberg, New UK Bribery Act 2010—Draconian in Theory but Is It Enforceable in Practice?, 5 CONSTRUCTION L. INT’L 19, 24 (2010); Maria Caspani, Interview—UK Bribery Act
Likely to End Up as “A Farce”—British Peer, TRUSTLAW (Oct. 29, 2012, 12:04
PM), http://m.trust.org/trustlaw/news/interview-uk-bribery-act-likely-to-endup-as-a-farce-british-peer/ (noting the lack of prosecutions under the U.K.
Bribery Act).
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disputes on the vagueness of terms in the U.K. Bribery Act,
which is a frequent critique of the FCPA, are easily correctable
either through the development of U.K. Bribery Act case law or
by turning to the terms’ definitions in literature and case law
184
on corporate governance. Any concerns about the “draconian”
and all-encompassing nature of the U.K. Bribery Act will likely
be corrected or avoided with continued use of the U.K. Bribery
Act, as evidenced by the Minister of Justice’s explanation that
“the ultimate aim of [the Bribery Act] is to make life difficult
for the minority of organizations responsible for corruption, not
to burden the vast majority of decent and law-abiding busi185
nesses.” Despite its criticisms, the U.K. Bribery Act is an important attempt to raise international standards of bribery
regulation and to force corporations to institute internal con186
trols to prevent bribery.
III. AMENDING THE FCPA TO INCLUDE A PROVISION
BANNING INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY
The United States currently uses a number of methods to
prosecute those who commit private-sector bribery. Although
each method helps to eliminate acts of bribery, none are able to
fully accomplish DOJ goals on an individual basis. To truly ensure that the United States remains a world leader in working
to eradicate both public and private-sector bribery, other “after
the fact” methods to prosecute private-sector bribery must be
replaced with an amended FCPA that criminalizes all forms of
foreign bribery.
A. AMENDING THE FCPA TO INCLUDE A PRIVATE-SECTOR
BRIBERY COMPONENT
The addition of a private-sector bribery component to the
FCPA is the ideal method to ensure that the United States remains a leader in eliminating foreign bribery. The DOJ’s current techniques, including tag-along Travel Act actions and
mail and wire fraud statute prosecutions, require additional
184. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1185.
185. Robert Amaee, Robert Amaee on U.K. Bribery Act Guidance, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Mar. 31, 2011, 12:08 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/
03/robert-amaee-on-uk-bribery-act-guidance.html (quoting U.K. Minister of
Justice Kenneth Clarke).
186. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1188.
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hurdles that squander crucial resources from the more important discovery and investigation of new instances of privatesector bribery. Additionally, without a foreign private-sector
bribery component in the FCPA, the DOJ misses the opportunity to use the full weight, power, and threat of FCPA actions to
deter acts of private-sector bribery by companies. If both public
and private-sector bribery were contained within a single statute, similar to the U.K. Bribery Act, prosecutors could avoid tedious and confusing prosecutions while increasing awareness of
the illegality of private-sector bribery.
Fortunately for the United States, amending the FCPA to
include a provision on private bribery does not require reinventing the wheel. First, definitions of private commercial bribery, or general bribery, can be found in twenty-nine state stat187
ute books. Currently, the FCPA is explicit in defining publicsector bribery as an entity separate from other forms of brib188
ery. If Congress preferred to keep the statute’s language in
its current form, it could easily add a separate definition for
commercial bribery and leave other sections untouched. Conversely, the amendment could borrow the spirit, if not the
189
wording, of the U.K. Bribery Act.
The U.K. Bribery Act
makes no distinction between public and private-sector brib190
ery. Taking this route, Congress would need to restructure
the definition of bribery in the FCPA to expand its breadth, and
hopefully, simplicity. As such, Congress has dual alternatives
for amending the FCPA to include a foreign private-sector component; Congress could either (1) eliminate all references to the
“public” nature of the bribery, or (2) add a new section to the
FCPA that specifically refers to commercial bribery. Either option would guarantee that private-sector bribery becomes a
significant part of the FCPA.
However, in its current form, the FCPA is much more
amenable to the addition of private bribery language, as opposed to the modification of existing language. Each section of
191
the FCPA denotes ways a party might violate the FCPA. As
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3) (2006).
See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (defining bribery).
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3).
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opposed to changing this oft-referenced definition, Congress
could add a provision that additionally bars the use of commercial bribery to garner unfair business advantages. This change
would ensure that each reference in the FCPA to the definition
of “bribery” would also include reference to bribes of private actors. Borrowing language from both the FCPA and the U.K.
Bribery Act, an example to the changes to each section of the
FCPA could read as such:
(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title or a domestic concern (as defined
in section 78dd-2 of this title), or for any person, officer, director, employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on
behalf of such person, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value to—
(4) any person, officer, director, employee, or agent of such person for
purposes of—
(A)(i) inducing a person to perform improperly a relevant function
or activity, or (ii) to reward a person for the improper performance
of such a function or activity.

The disadvantage to only amending existing FCPA language is that it would be difficult to account for those who accept bribes, as opposed to only those who make bribes, as done
192
in the U.K. Bribery Act. Currently, this group is entirely excluded from FCPA prosecution. However, this suggested “quickfix” of FCPA language would avoid the arduous task of revising
existing FCPA language and would take great strides in exponentially expanding the breadth of FCPA bribery actions until
the appropriate time to undertake a complete overhaul of the
FCPA.
B. ADDITION OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR COMPONENT IS CONSISTENT
WITH CURRENT DOJ GOALS
According
Greg Andres,
tional bribery
193
Justice.” He

to a statement by Assistant Attorney General
the “investigation and prosecution of transnais an important priority for the Department of
followed by noting that “bribery in international

192. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 2.
193. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing

2316

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2285

business transactions weakens economic development; it undermines confidence in the marketplace; and it distorts compe194
tition.” This mindset demonstrates the government’s recognition of international bribery as a great harm, and though he
was referring to public-sector bribery, his words could easily
apply to the harms of private-sector bribery as well.
As of September 2011, there was an estimated thirty-three
resolved FCPA enforcement actions for the year, behind 2010’s
195
record of seventy-four resolved FCPA actions.
Although
FCPA prosecutions also fell during 2012, the decline is likely
attributable to the lengthy “trench warfare” necessary to take a
196
successful FCPA action to trial.
In line with still sizable
numbers of FCPA indictments, the number of tag-along Travel
197
Act actions that prosecute private bribery is also increasing.
Recognizing the immense harm that bribery can cause through
the “diversion of resources, the distortion of free markets and
198
damage to society,” the DOJ must encourage Congress to
amend the FCPA to include international private-sector bribery.
The FCPA was passed after Congress’s realization that
foreign bribery was a legitimate threat to both the payer and
199
the recipient of bribes. However, the DOJ’s inability to efficiently prosecute all forms of bribery under the FCPA hampers
this original goal and highlights the necessity for a new FCPA
that can prosecute both public-sector and private-to-private
bribery. This amendment would ensure that the FCPA is in full
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Dep’t of Justice).
194. Id. at 4–5.
195. Benjamin D. Klein et al., DOJ and SEC Affirm Continued Commitment to Rigorous FCPA Enforcement, MORGAN LEWIS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://
www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.print/publicationID/3e
a3637d-4eb4-49c1-aaef-53ac7fb6bcf9/.
196. See 2012 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 2, 2013), http://
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx
(noting that “vast government resources [were] poured into the comprehensive
FCPA Resource Guide” in 2012).
197. See Cassin, supra note 75 (finding that prior to 2005, the Travel Act
was only used in a handful of cases to prosecute private bribery).
198. JOINT COMM. ON THE DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, FIRST REPORT OF SESSION
2008–09, 2008–09, H.L. 115-I, H.C. 430-I, at 8.
199. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 617.
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compliance with Congress’s wishes to eliminate the potential
harms caused by bribery to all parties and society at large. Despite the DOJ’s inability to prosecute bribery under one, clear
statute, it is a sign of progress that private-sector international
bribery is becoming more recognized. With the increased recognition of private-sector bribery as a credible threat, the next
step must be strong legislation that enables clarity in the law
and eradicates foreign private-sector bribery.
C. THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT CLIMATE IS IDEAL FOR AN
AMENDMENT TO THE FCPA
Now is the ideal time to add an international private-sector
bribery component to the FCPA. On June 14, 2011, the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Securities (Subcommittee) listened to arguments on
200
whether the FCPA needed amending. Faced with calls from
groups that the FCPA is too vague and damages American
business competitiveness abroad, the Subcommittee considered
proposals by the Chamber of Commerce, including: adding a
compliance defense to FCPA actions, limiting a company’s liability for actions of acquired companies and for its subsidiaries,
adding a “willfulness” requirement for corporate liability, and
201
clearly defining “foreign official” under the statute. Following
such review, in 2012, the DOJ released new guidance on the
202
FCPA to help quell such concerns, but critics still argue that
the FCPA could use revision to increase its clarity and trans203
parency.
Critics concerned with vagueness might find that the addition of more terms to the FCPA would only increase its sometimes confusing and overbroad nature. As noted, many are attempting to work for specific, clear definitions to be included in
200. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2011).
201. See id. at 19–20 (statement of Hon. Michael Mukasey).
202. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27.
203. Mike Koehler, Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales Criticizes
Various Aspects of DOJ FCPA Enforcement, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-alberto-gonzales
-criticizes-various-aspects-of-doj-fcpa-enforcement (noting former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales’s discontent with the slow pace of FCPA reform).
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the FCPA. However, the addition of the public-sector component has the potential to reduce such criticized ambiguities. In
line with the U.K. Bribery Act, if the terms were specific to include all “persons,” this would negate questions as to who is allowed to accept a bribe. By encompassing all forms of bribery in
the FCPA, a need for a distinction between private companies
and public officials would vanish.
The recently released FCPA Guidance by the DOJ shows
that Congress and the executive branch are amenable to listening to calls for change to the FCPA and that now is the ideal
time to ask Congress to also consider bringing the FCPA in line
with new international norms by adding a private-sector bribery component.
CONCLUSION
Private-sector bribery regulation is not a new idea, but it is
novel for the United States to directly incorporate such regulation in the FCPA. Both domestically and internationally, states
and countries have recognized the corrosive effect of allowing
businesses to unfairly compete and pay bribes, whether such
bribe is to a government official or any other person in international business. Such actions disadvantage newcomers, competitors, and hurt industries, as well as the countries in which
they reside. The United States has already begun to follow the
trend of other countries to prosecute transnational privatesector bribery through the use of pre-existing statutes that
were not originally intended to handle such crimes. Unsurprisingly, the use of statutes such as the Travel Act and the mail
and wire fraud statutes are inadequate solutions for the international goal of eradicating private-sector bribery.
The United Kingdom had experienced issues similar to the
United States in the application of its existing bribery laws.
Without amendment, the British bribery laws did not meet the
standards of the international community and were vague and
difficult to apply. By renovating its entire bribery regulatory
system, the United Kingdom not only joined the United States
as a leader in prosecuting public and private-sector bribery, but
surpassed it in breadth. The FCPA does not need to be entirely
rewritten, but as a statute originally passed by Congress in
1977, it must be updated to coincide with modern trends in
prosecuting international private-sector bribery. An addition of
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a commercial bribery component to the FCPA will ensure that
the United States is not surpassed by other nations as a leader
in fighting international bribery and will demonstrate its continuing dedication to championing fair and honest international business practices.

